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RECENT CASES
AD LMNSTRATIVE PROCEDURE-NOTICE AND HEARING
ARE REQUIRED BEFORE CAB MAY RESTRICT AN EFFECTIVE CER-
TIFICATE PURSUANT TO A TIMELY PETITION FOr RECONSIDERATION
The Civil Aeronautics Board awarded to Delta Air Lines a certificate
of public convenience and necessity which was to become effective in sixty
days.1 An intervenor in the proceedings petitioned for reconsideration,
requesting certain restrictions on Delta's certificate and a stay of the effec-
tive date of the certificate if the petition was not acted upon by that date.
The Board denied the request for a stay but reserved judgment on the
merits of the petition.2 On the prescribed date the certificate became
effective and Delta commenced operations under it. Five months later
the Board, acting on the petition for reconsideration, amended Delta's
certificate by adding the restrictions proposed by the intervenor.3 The
amendment was made summarily without formal notice or opportunity for
a hearing on the petition. Delta's objection that-the Board lacked power
to alter a certificate after its effective date without notice and hearing was
overruled by the Board. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed,4 and this decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court, with three
justices dissenting. CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961).
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provides that a certificate of con-
venience and necessity "shall be effective from the date specified therein," r
and may be altered, suspended, or revoked only after notice and hearing.0
Under its reconsideration procedure, the CAB, upon the petition of any
party to a proceeding, will summarily review its orders.7 Although the
Board has generally issued orders on reconsideration before the effective
date of certificates, it has occasionally suggested that it possessed the power
to modify a certificate without notice and hearing even after the effective
date.8 But this assertion was never passed upon by a court until the
I Great Lakes-Southeast Serv. Case, Av. L. REP. 1 22211 (CAB Sept. 30, 1958).
2 Great Lakes-Southeast Serv. Case, Av. L. REP. 22224 (CAB Nov. 28, 1958).
3 Great Lakes-Southeast Serv. Case, Av. L. RP. 22265 (CAB May 7, 1959).
4 Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 280 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1960).
5 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §401(f), 72 Stat. 755, 49 U.S.C. 31371(f)
(1958).
6 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §401(g), 72 Stat. 756, 49 U.S.C. §1371(g)
(1958).
7 14 C.F.R. § 302.37(a) (1961).
8 Shortly after the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the Authority
(now the Board) took the position that § 401 (f) of the act, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 988 (now
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(e), 72 Stat. 755, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(e) (1958)),
which empowered the Authority to attach "to the exercise of the privileges granted
by the certificate . . . such reasonable terms, conditions, and limitations as the
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instant case, and decisions involving analogous questions of an agency's
power to alter its certificates have failed to indicate a consistent approach
to statutory interpretation or policy considerations which would have settled
the issue.9 In United States v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,10 for example, the
Supreme Court invalidated a restriction placed on the effective certificate
of a water carrier by the Interstate Commerce Commission," declaring that
total or partial revocation may be accomplished only in the manner spe-
cifically prescribed by Congress. But in United States v. Rock Island
Motor Transit Co.,1 2 the Court allowed general statutory provisions to
override a specific statutory prohibition against certificate restriction, giving
public interest may require," permitted the Authority to change such terms and
conditions without notice and hearing. 1 ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. oN ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCEDURE, MONO. No. 19, THE CIVIL AERONAUTICS AUTHORITY 59 n.58
(1940) ; see Cincinnati-New York Additional Serv., 8 C.A.B. 603, 606 (1947) ; North
Cent. Case, 8 C.A.B. 208, 212-13 (1947), in which the Board modified, upon recon-
sideration without notice and hearing, certificates which had become effective. But see
Kansas City-Memphis-Fla. Case, 9 C.A.B. 401 (1948), where the Board did not
reach the question, but in dictum indicated it would avoid the problem in the future
by deciding reconsideration petitions prior to the effective date; Ryan, The Revoca-
tion of an Airline Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 15 J. AIR L. & CoM.
377 (1948). But the Board subsequently did modify certificates summarily upon
reconsideration. South Cent. Area Local Serv. Case, Av. L. REP. 22255 (CAB
March 29, 1959) ; Service to Phoenix Case, 25 C.A.B. 647 (1957).
9 See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 285 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 194 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1952). Compare Spring-
field Airport Authority v. CAB, 285 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1960), with Standard
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949). Other relevant cases involve
the Interstate Commerce Act §212(a), Part II, 49 Stat. 555 (1935), as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1958), which is substantially similar to the Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, §§401(f)-(g), 72 Stat. 755, 49 U.S.C. §§1371(f)-(g) (1958). See,
e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns v. Frisco Transp. Co., 358 U.S. 133 (1958); Falwell
v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 71 (W.D. Va. 1946), aff'd mere., 330 U.S. 807 (1947).
Compare Watson Bros. Transp. Co. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 905 (D.C. Neb.
1955), aff'd inem., 350 U.S. 927 (1956), with United States v. Texas & Pac. Motor
Transp. Co., 340 U.S. 450 (1951).
10 329 U.S. 424 (1947).
11 Seatrain had been granted a certificate to carry commodities generally, subject
to "'such terms, conditions and limitations as are now, or may hereafter be, attached
to the exercise of such authority by this Commission.'" Id. at 427. Since there is
no statutory provision for suspension or revocation of water carrier certificates as there
is for motor carrier certificates in the Interstate Commerce Act § 212(a), Part II,
49 Stat 555 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1958), the Commission sought
to change the certificate under its power to fix "terms, conditions and limitations" for
water carrier certificates, under Interstate Commerce Act § 309(d), 54 Stat 942
(1940), 49 U.S.C. § 909(a) (1958). The Court held that this did not give the Com-
mission the right to restrict Seatrain's effective certificate. The decision may also
rest on the alternative ground that the Commission could not have placed the pro-
posed restrictions even on the initial certificate.
12340 U.S. 419 (1951). The Interstate Commerce Commission had approved the
purchase of a motor carrier by a rail carrier and issued a certificate "'subject to such
further limitations, restrictions, or modifications as we may find it necessary to
impose or make in order to insure that the service shall be auxiliary or supplementary
to the train service . . . and shall not unduly restrain competition.'" Id. at 424.
The Commission later sought to add certain restrictions to the certificate. The Court
held that this was not a revocation prohibited by § 212(a) of the Interstate Commerce
Act, but was a permissible reservation of the right to make changes in the conditions
embodied in the certificate, to insure that the motor service remained auxiliary and
supplemental to railroad operations, under § 5(2) (b) of the act, 54 Stat. 906 (1940), 49
U.S.C. § 5(2) (b) (1958), which provides that sich service shall not unduly restrain
competition. See generally 63 HARV. L. REv. 1437 (1950).
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little weight to the carrier's protest that it would lose a large part of the
expenditures it had made in reliance on its certificate.13
The Court in the present case based its refusal to allow restriction of a
certificate after its effective date without notice and hearing on two clearly
enunciated principles: that an administrative agency may not follow pro-
cedures which go beyond the strict confines of its statutory authorization,
and that reliance by an air carrier on the finality of an awarded certificate-
"security of route"-must be protected as far as reasonably possible. 14
The case thereby settles a narrow and previously unresolved question of
CAB procedure, but it may assume a broader significance if its stated prin-
ciples are applied in deciding allied questions involving the competing
interests of flexibility and finality in the administrative process. By follow-
ing the Seatrain case and treating Rock Island as a holding limited to its
precise facts, the Court seems to have firmly adopted the principle of strict
agency conformity to statutory authorization. However, since the Court
relied markedly on a declaration of intent in the legislative history of the
Federal Aviation Act to provide security of route to air carriers,15 the
result in any future case and the extent to which the Court applies its
stated principles may be noticeably affected by the strength of this element
in the legislative history of the particular statute in question.
The instant case serves to focus attention on some perennial dilemmas
of procedure confronting the CAB. By identifying several authorized
alternative procedures by which the Board can avoid the notice and hearing
requirement, 16 the Court made it clear that it did not intend to curtail the
13 The railroad had originally refused to consummate the purchase if the Com-
mission insisted on one of the very restrictions which the Commission later imposed.
See Rock Island Motor Transit Co., 55 M.C.C. 567, 576-77 (1949).
14 The dissenting justices were of the opinion that a timely filed petition for recon-
sideration operates to continue the Board's jurisdiction over the proceedings and
that therefore an order of the Board is not final until the order on reconsideration is
issued, regardless of the effective date on the face of the certificate. The majority
admitted that an order while reconsideration is pending is not "final" for the purpose
of judicial review, but held that it could be "final" for other purposes.
15 See instant case at 323-25.
16A certificate may be modified upon reconsideration without notice and hearing
at any time before the effective date. Southwest Airways Co. v. CAB, 196 F.2d 937
(9th Cir. 1952). But the Board contended in the instant case that the short
time between an initial order and its effective date might well permit only hasty and
really meaningless reconsiderations, especially in complex area proceedings. Brief
for CAB, p. 22. However, the effective date may be postponed to give ample time
for reconsideration. Southwest Airways Co. v. CAB, supra. But the Board argued
that this additional delay is a disadvantage to both the carrier and the public. Brief
for CAB, p. 22. In the present case, for example, the Board was anxious to have
Delta inaugurate service during the peak winter season. See Great Lakes-Southeast
Serv. Case, Av. L. REP. if 22224 (CAB Nov. 28, 1958). For an approximation of time
consumed in the Board's hearing procedure, see HOUSE CoMM. ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS, 85TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SURVEY AND STUDY OF AnxmTRATIVE ORGANI-
ZATION, PROCEDURE, AND PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL AGENCIES 1165 (Comm. Print
1957).
The Court in the instant case said that under § 401(d) (2) of the act, 72 Stat.
755, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(d) (2) (1958), the Board could grant a temporary certificate,
limited so as to expire on the date set for the isslance of the order on reconsidera-
tion. Instant case at 329 (dictum). But in Continental Air Lines, Inc., Additional
Air Serv. in Texas, 4 C.A.B. 215, 228 (1943), and Eastern Air Lines Autoziro
Serv., 2 C.A.B. 54 (1940), the Board held that the act does not authorize granting
1961]
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Board's power of reconsideration, but only to insist on the Board's follow-
ing the statutory requirement for notice and hearing when the decision in a
certification proceeding is reconsidered after the certificate has become
effective. But, even though it has used the alternative procedures in the
past, the Board contended that they are productive of inefficiency and
delay.17 By limiting the Board to these procedures, therefore, the present
case suggests the need for a reappraisal of the CAB's adjudicatory process.'
8
In "economic proceedings" such as certification, after a full hearing and
initial decision by an examiner,'9 a case may be briefed and argued before
the Board,20 which then decides the case on the basis of the entire record,
without being bound by any of the examiner's findings. 21 And even after
this cumbersome process, the Board may grant reconsideration of its deci-
sion.22 A former CAB member has charged that this system, coupled with
the gigantic size of most records and shortage of time, results in the Board's
conducting, in effect, a new trial in which the decision of the examiner is
given little consideration and issues are decided solely on the basis of briefs
and oral argument.23 Although a provision for reconsideration may be
necessary under present procedure in order that the Board may have a
chance to correct mistakes or omissions in its original decision, it has been
argued that present procedure should be fundamentally overhauled so as
to give more weight to the hearing examiner's findings and decision, with
appeal to the Board being limited, somewhat in the manner of judicial
review, to questions of law and policy.24 Delegation of authority and limita-
tion of the scope of Board review, it is claimed, would speed up the
adjudicatory process, promote efficiency, and leave the Board with more
time in which to exercise its important policymaking functions. 25 Under
such a system, reconsideration could be eliminated entirely, since its present
purpose would be adequately served by the Board's appellate-type review.
a temporary certificate to one who has applied for a permanent certificate. Even if this
procedure were to be held valid, its practical disadvantages would limit its usefulness
to the Board. A carrier would be hesitant to risk the enormous investment which
must be made to begin flights on a new major route if it knew that its certificate was
liable to be terminated or modified without regard to the adequacy of the service
actually rendered.
17 Brief for CAB, pp. 22-23.
18The court of appeals admitted that "the Board's dilemma is real but we find
that this dilemma is inherent in the statutory scheme of Sections 401(f) and
401(g)." Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 280 F.2d 43, 48 (2d Cir. 1960). See
generally ATT'Y. GEN. Comm. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT
41-73 (1941); LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELEcT,
86 Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. on the Judiciary Print 1960); Hector, Problems of the
CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69 YALE L.J. 931 (1960).
19 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 302.24-.28 (1961). In certain cases the examiner may certify
the record to the Board, which prepares the initial decision. 14 C.F.R. § 302.29 (1961).
20 14 C.F.R. §§ 302.30-.32 (1961).
2114 C.F.R. § 302.36 (1961).
22 14 C.F.R. § 302.37 (1961).
23 Hector, supra note 18, at 945.
24 ATT'Y. GEN. Coamm. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT 51 (1941).
Mr. Landis advocates that the Board's review be discretionary, similar to certiorari
in the Supreme Court of the United States. See LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 18,
at 85.
25 See id. at 17-19, 41-45, 65, 85.
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In effect, the examiner would assume most of the decisionmaking functions
currently vested in the Board, and the Board would merge the reviewing
functions of its current decisionmaking and reconsideration procedures into
one appellate decision, thereby promoting efficiency without sacrificing
either flexibility or route security. Since the present case has defined a
statutory limit on the Board's assumed power to restrict certificates upon
reconsideration, a solution to the Board's problems by expanding the scope
of summary reconsideration would have to come from Congress. This
solution, however, would violate Congress' earlier policy of securing
maximum protection of operating routes. The reform proposed, on the
other hand, could be effected by the Board itself within the existing
statutory framework 26 and has the merit of dealing with reconsideration
in the larger context of the entire adjudicatory process.
BANKRUPTCY: ASSETS-TusTEE NOT VESTED WITH BANK-
RUPT'S RIGIT TO REFUND FOR TFNTATIVE NET OPERATING Loss
CA.MYBACK ADJUSTMENT BASED oN TAx zABL YER in WHICH
BANKRUPTCY PETmIO FI.ED
Due to severe business reverses in the first half of 1956, taxpayer
Sussman filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy on June 7, 1956. In
March 1957, the trustee in bankruptcy, on behalf of Sussman but without
his authorization, applied for and obtained a tax refund in the nature of a
tentative carryback adjustment for the profitable years 1954 and 1955,
based on Sussman's net operating loss for the calendar year 1956.1 In
June 1957, upon the petition of Sussman, the referee ordered the trustee
to surrender the proceeds of the refund check to Sussman. 2 By a petition
2 6 The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 makes no provision for reconsideration. That
procedure was established by the Board in its Rules of Practice, 14 C.F.R. § 302
(1961), which the Board adopts and revises pursuant to its general rulemaking
power under § 204(a) of the act, 72 Stat. 743, 49 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1958).
1 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172, as amended, 72 Stat. 1611 (1958). The
provision for a tentative refund within ninety days of an application for an adjust-
ment, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6411(b), apparently is intended to assist an indi-
vidual taxpayer who needs immediate funds to rehabilitate a failing business.
2 The primary basis for the referee's order was the theory that since Sussman
and his wife had filed a joint tax return, thereby incurring joint and several liability
for all payments thereunder, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6013(d) (3), under Pennsyl-
vania law, the right to claim any refund for the years of the joint return would
vest in husband and wife by the entirety. Cf. Pennsylvania Trust Co. v. Mischik,
96 Pa. Super. 255 (1929). Since the right to a refund was not transferable by the
husband alone, either at bankruptcy or within six months thereafter, the trustee
was not vested, as of June 7, 1956, or thereafter, with "title" to the right to claim
a carryback refund. York Radio & Refrigerator Parts, 20 Pa. D. & C.2d 85 (C.P.
1959); cf. Green Estate, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 595 (Orphans' Ct 1958); MacNeill
Estate, 21 Pa. D. &. C.2d 480 (Orphans' Ct. 1959). See generally 4 COLLiER,
BANKRUPTCY 1170.17, at 1035-40 (14th ed. 1954). The district court, by way of
dictum, allowed that there was "some basis in the Code" for this theory, but chose
to rest its conclusion on other grounds. In the Matter of Sussman, 188 F. Supp. 320,
323-24 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
19611
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to review the referee's order, the trustee raised an issue of first impression-
whether a trustee in bankruptcy is vested with "title" to a carryback refund
based on the year of the bankruptcy. The district court affirmed the
referee's order 3 and was in turn affirmed by the Third Circuit, which held
that, according to section 6411(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
no right to apply for a tentative carryback refund could accrue to Sussman
until after December 31, 1956, the end of his taxable year.4 Thus, since
this right was not one which Sussman could have transferred on the date
of bankruptcy, 5 the trustee was not vested as of that date with title to the
refund check," and Sussman therefore received a "windfall . . . at the
expense of the creditors." 7 In the Matter of Sussnn, 289 F.2d 76 (3d
Cir. 1961).
Before 1938, bankruptcy law permitted similar windfalls to the bank-
rupt by allowing him to withhold from the estate vested in the trustee three
kinds of property or property rights which might accrue to him after the
petition in bankruptcy was filed: (1) contingent interests in real prop-
erty which at bankruptcy were neither transferable, assignable, nor the
proper subject of a judicial sale, but which became so shortly thereafter,8
(2) property which after bankruptcy vested in the bankrupt by bequest,
devise, or inheritance,9 and (3) property held by the entirety at bankruptcy
to which the bankrupt subsequently acceded by right of survivorship. 10
Courts faced with these three situations, while reluctant to reach in-
equitable results, felt constrained to leave to Congress the task of providing
a remedy.1  Section 70(a) of the Chandler Act of 1938 12 was intended
8 1n the Matter of Sussman, supra note 2.
4 Under INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 6411(a), "the application . . . shall be filed,
on or after the date of filing of the return for the taxable year of the net operating
loss from which the carryback results . .. ."
5 The date of bankruptcy is "the date when the petition was filed." Bankruptcy
Act (Chandler Act) § 1(13), 52 Stat. 841 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1(13) (1958).6 The Bankruptcy Act §§70(a) (5), (6), 52 Stat. 880 (1938), as amended, 11
U.S.C. §§ 110(a) (5), (6) (1958), vests in the trustee, as of the date of bankruptcy, title
to "property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing of the petition [the
bankrupt] . . . could by any means have transferred or which might have been
levied upon and sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, im-
pounded or sequestered . . . " subject to certain exceptions not here relevant, and
"rights of action arising upon contracts, or usury, or the unlawful taking or detention
of or injury to his property . . . ." See also note 14 infra.
7In the Matter of Sussman, 289 F.2d 76, 78 (1961).
8 See In re Baker, 13 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 733 (1926).
9 See In re Swift, 259 Fed. 612 (N.D. Ga. 1919).
10 See Dioguardi v. Curran, 35 F.2d 431 (4th Cir. 1929). See generally Note,
The Effect of Bankruptcy on Estates by the Entireties, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 1003
(1940).
1 See cases cited notes 8-10 supra. In In re Swift, 259 Fed. 612 (N.D.
Ga. 1919), the court dismissed a petition to set aside Swift's adjudication as a bank-
rupt, in the face of allegations that Swift, knowing that the death of his aged mother
was imminent, fraudulently filed a petition in bankruptcy in order to withhold his
inheritance from the trustee and thereby retain it free of obligations to creditors.
In Chandler v. Nathans, 6 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1925), the court was able to reach an
equitable result by holding that title to a claim for a tax refund based on an over-
payment was vested in the trustee as a perfected and transferable right of action due
to an "unlawful taking . . . of . . . property" by the Government. See Bank-
ruptcy Act § 70(a) (6), 52 Stat. 880 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (6) (1958).
1252 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1958).
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in part to perfect the overall title of the trustee by correcting abuses which
arose when debtors, having received liberal credit from tradesmen who
relied upon expectancies, invoked existing bankruptcy law, escaped liability
on their obligations, and retained for themselves the after-acquired prop-
erty. 13 In order to eliminate such fraudulent activity, the Chandler Act
vested in the trustee, by operation of law, title to certain types of property
acquired by the bankrupt within six months after bankruptcy.14 Unfor-
tunately, when Congress enacted the carryback sections into the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939,15 it failed to anticipate the potential of these provi-
sions for working similar inequity in bankruptcy proceedings.
Faced with a problem analogous to the dilemma of courts prior to the
Chandler Act, the court in the present case also followed a policy of judicial
restraint. It implicitly recognized that although a bankruptcy court is a
court of equity, its jurisdiction is derived wholly from the bankruptcy
law; 16 accordingly, the court was powerless to act where Congress
had failed to provide the necessary authority. Once this premise was
accepted, a logical application of existing law virtually compelled the
conclusion reached in the instant case. 17  To have decided otherwise
13 See H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1937) ; NAT'L BAwKRUPTCY
CONF., HousE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 74TH CONG., 2D Sass., ANALYSIS OF H.R.
12889, at 226 n.4 (Comm. Print 1936).
14 The act vests the trustee with title to (1) "contingent remainders, executory
devises and limitations, rights of entry for condition broken, rights or possibilities
of reverter, and like interests in real property, which were nonassignable prior to
bankruptcy and which, within six months thereafter, become assignable interests or
estates . . . ," (2) "all property . . . which vests in the bankrupt within six
months after bankruptcy by bequest, devise or inheritance . . . " and (3) "all
property . . . in which the bankrupt has at the date of bankruptcy an estate or
interest by the entirety and which within six months after bankruptcy becomes trans-
ferable in whole or in part solely by the bankrupt . . . . " Bankruptcy Act § 70(a),
52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1958). See generally 4 COLLIER,
op. cit. supra note 2, 70.03, at 938-39; 26 TExAs L. REv. 526 (1947) ; 1947 WIs. L.
REv. 398.
'5 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 23(s), 122, added by ch. 247, 53 Stat. 867 (1939)
(now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 172); Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 3780(a)-(b), 3781,
added by ch. 340, 59 Stat. 521, 523 (1945) (now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6411).
16 See In re Stearns & Wite Co., 295 Fed. 833 (7th Cir. 1924); In re Fox
West Coast Theatres, 25 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal. 1936), aff'd, 88 F.2d 212 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 301 U.S. 710 (1937). Compare In re Barnett, 124 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir.
1942).
17The trustee boldly argned that when the petition was filed Sussman had a
vested property right to a carryback refund, subject to complete defeasance, which
was transferable by him on that date and therefore vested in the trustee on the date
of bankruptcy. Brief for Appellant, pp. 9-14. Both courts, however, rejected this
contention, the court of appeals concluding that the expectation of a future claim on
June 7, 1956, was at best a contingent claim against the United States, the trans-
ferability of which is narrowly restricted by the Assignment of Claims Act, REv. STAT.
§ 3477 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1958). Instant case at 78.
The opinion of the district court in the instant case added unnecessarily to the
complexity of the issue by implying that if the right to a carryback refund had
accrued to Sussman within six months after bankruptcy, application of § 70(a) could
have vested title to that right in the trustee. In the Matter of Sussman, 188 F. Supp.
320, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1961). However, under the facts of the instant case, the pro-
vision for future interests which become assignable within six months after bank-
ruptcy can have no application; the apparent legislative intent and ejitsdem generis
construction of the statutory words "and like interests in real property" restrict the
reach of this provision to interests in realty. See 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 2,
1961]
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would have required the court to twist the plain meaning of the statutes
and conjure up a supposed legislative intent where none obviously existed.
It is unfortunate that the hands of the court were so tied, for the result
of the instant case and its potential effects certainly do violence to the
general policy of the bankruptcy law to enable an individual or corporation
heavily in debt to win a reprieve by surrendering all assets at the date of
bankruptcy for proportionate distribution to creditors. The inequitable
effect of the present case, recognized in the court's opinion,18 is to permit or
even encourage a bankrupt to retain tax benefits which are derived from
the very losses that brought about the condition of bankruptcy, rather
than to apply this fund to satisfy, at least in part, the obligations to creditors
which made it possible in the first place to claim the carryback adjustment.19
It is inconsistent with a premise underlying the bankruptcy law for a bank-
rupt to emerge holding assets while bona fide obligations still remain
partially or completely unsatisfied.
The instant case may have a significant effect on corporate bankruptcy.
Heretofore, corporations have seldom bothered to obtain a discharge in
bankruptcy proceedings; 20 usually they merely become extinct following
the adjudication 2 The present holding, however, may encourage a bank-
rupt corporation which is entitled to a carryback refund 2 to petition for
a discharge in order to receive the refund clear of creditors' obligations, to
which the proceeds of the refund would be subject if the bankrupt cor-
70.37, at 1194. Moreover, the right dearly could not have vested in the trustee by
application of the "bequest, devise or inheritance" provision. Therefore, the only
potential application to Sussman's windfall of the § 70(a) provisions for the three
types of after-acquired property must be the provision for estates held by the entirety
by bankrupt at filing. See instant case at 77 n.1; note 25 infra.
18 Instant case at 78.
19 Under the theory of the court of appeals, if Sussman had filed a petition
in bankruptcy on January 2, 1957, the trustee might have been vested with title
to his refund claim as of that date; on the other hand, if the petition had been
filed on December 31, 1956, under the same facts the trustee would not be vested
with title to the refund claim. This analysis assumes that the provisions of the
Assignment of Claims Act, REv. STAT. §3477 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. §203
(1958), do not prevent transfer of a right to a carryback refund. In order to avoid
the necessity of applying the Assignment of Claims Act to satisfy the requirement
of transferability under § 70(a) (5), the right to a carryback refund might be con-
strued to be a right of action arising from quasi-contract under § 70(a) (6), which does
not require transferability at bankruptcy of certain kinds of rights in order for them
to vest in the trustee. See Sultzbach Clothing Co. v. United States, 10 F.2d 363,
364-65 (W.D.N.Y. 1925), for a discussion of the quasi-contractual nature of a claim
for refund of a fine unlawfully imposed. See generally 4 CoLLIER, op. cit. supra note 2,
1170.28, at 1164-67; 1 WnLIsToN, CoNTRAcTs § 3, at 10 n.8 (rev. ed. 1936).
20 In the case of an individual in bankruptcy the adjudication operates as an
application for a discharge which will be granted as of course by the court, after notice
to interested parties, if no objections to the discharge are filed within a fixed period.
However, a corporation desiring a discharge must petition the court for it within
six months after adjudication. Bankruptcy Act § 14(a), 52 Stat. 850 (1938),
as amended, 11 U.S.C. §32(a) (1958). See generally 1 CoLLMR, op. cit. supra
note 2, 1111 .02, 1.12, 14.04, 14.05.
21 See 1 COLLmR, op. cit. supra note 2, ff 14.04, at 1261.
22 That is, a corporation with a substantial net operating profit in the years
immediately preceding a year with a substantial net operating loss which results
in bankruptcy in that year.
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poration did not receive such a discharge. Since bankruptcy law limits the
grounds for objecting to a discharge to certain specifically enumerated
offenses,2 none of which the bankrupt corporation would be likely to have
committed, the trustee and creditors would be powerless to challenge on
equitable grounds the corporation's discharge by the court. The possibility
of this misuse of bankruptcy by corporations is an additional incentive for
Congress to provide a remedy along the lines of the provisions of the
Chandler Act, which effectively eliminated similar abuses.
Section 70(a) should be amended to provide that title to a carryback
refund right which accrues to the bankrupt as a result of net operating
losses sustained during the taxable year in which the petition is filed shall
vest by operation of law retroactively in the trustee as of the date of
bankruptcy.24 In order to provide for the most equitable distribution of the
refund proceeds, the amendment should limit the trustee's title to a part
of the refund that is equal to the proportion of the total net operating loss
for the taxable year that is sustained prior to bankruptcy. Although
such a provision might delay the discharge of some bankrupts, the delay
would generally be slight and in most cases nonexistent. Since, in practice,
discharge is seldom granted earlier than seven months after the filing of the
petition 25 under the facts of the present case the bankrupt would probably
not have been discharged before January 1957. Under an amended provi-
sion, Sussman's trustee, on behalf of Sussman, could have filed a tax return
and application for a tentative carryback adjustment as early as January
2, 1957.26 Since the government is generally required to act on such ap-
plications within ninety days 27 and since the proportionate distribution
of the refund could have been determined previously, Sussman might have
been discharged no more than three months later than the earliest time at
which he could have been discharged under existing bankruptcy law.2 8 It is
23 See 74 Stat. 408 (1960), 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (Supp. II, 1961) ; 1 COLLIER, op. cit.
spra note 2, 1[ 14.07, at 1271.
24 Provision for retroactive vesting in the trustee of title to the refund right
would parallel the legal fictions already employed in § 70(a) with regard to non-
assignable future interests and tenancies by the entirety which vest solely in the bank-
rupt within six months after bankruptcy. See note 14 supra.
25 Creditors have six months from the first date set for the first creditors' meet-
ing in which to file their claims. Bankruptcy Act §57(m), 52 Stat. 867 (1938),
as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 93(n) (1958). See generally 3 COLLIER, Op. Cit. supra note 2,
57.27. The first meeting of creditors must be scheduled within ten to thirty days
after adjudication. 52 Stat. 867 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §91(a) (1958).
See generally 3 COLLIER, op. cit. sipra note 2, 55.02. Adjudication is an automatic
legal result of filing a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, 73 Stat. 109 (1959), 11
U.S.C. §41(f) (Supp. I, 1960). Moreover, there may be substantial delay between
the filing of an involuntary petition in bankruptcy and adjudication, since the court has
discretion to extend the statutory time limit for accepting the bankrupt's pleadings.
73 Stat. 571 (1959), 11 U.S.C. § 41(a)-(e) (Supp. I, 1959). See generally 2 COLLIER,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 11 18.34, at 75-76.
26 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6411 (a), quoted, in part, note 4 supra.
2 T INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6411(b).
28 It is not likely that if facts identical with those in the instant case should arise
under such an amended provision, the taxpayer would still receive a windfall. For
if a court were to determine conclusively that, as a result of their joint tax return,
see note 2 supra, the right to the carryback refund was held by bankrupt taxpayer
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possible that in rare situations a somewhat longer delay might be required
before a discharge could be granted.29  However, in view of the delay of
proceedings which is quite frequently necessitated by litigation to recover
the bankrupt's assets or to determine whether property has passed to him
within the meaning of the six-months provisions of the Chandler Act-
probate of a will or construction of a deed, for example-the potential delay
in discharge likely to be occasioned by such an amendment would pose no
serious threat to the orderly and efficient administration of bankruptcy
proceedings.
30
As an alternative, it might conceivably be possible to remedy the result
of the present case by amending the Internal Revenue Code so as to ter-
minate the taxable year of a bankrupt taxpayer, entitled to a carryback
adjustment, on the day before he files the petition in bankruptcy; the right
to the carryback refund would then be actually, rather than retroactively,
vested in the trustee on the date of bankruptcy. However, such manipula-
tion of the tax statute to accomplish a change in bankruptcy law might well
cause more difficulty than it would cure, by requiring bisection of the
normal taxable year 31 and demanding coordinate construction of two dis-
tinct and complex statutes. By vesting in the bankrupt, as of the date of
bankruptcy, "title" to the right to a carryback refund, such an amendment
would accomplish only the first step towards the desired result. It would
then be necessary to construe this right either as a transferable right of
action under section 70(a) (5) 32 or as a right of action arising upon con-
and his wife by the entirety, the trustee could be retroactively vested with title to
this right only if bankrupt taxpayer's wife died either within six months after bank-
ruptcy, making the right transferable by bankrupt taxpayer alone, or, though more
than six months after bankruptcy, still within the taxable year in which the petition
was filed. See note 14 supra.
29 The longest possible delay in discharge under an amended provision, assuming
no litigation over the right to the carryback refund or to assets claimed by the trustee
on behalf of the estate, would result, under the facts of the instant case, if Sussman
had filed his petition on January 2, 1956, the first official day of his taxable year.
It would then have been necessary to delay discharge until the termination of Suss-
man's taxable year, December 31, 1956, at which time it could have been determined
whether Sussman was entitled to a carryback adjustment based on a net operating
loss for his taxable year 1956. If he was not, Sussman could have been discharged
twelve months after the petition. If he was, the trustee would be vested by operation
of law with title to a proportionate share of the refund right as of the date of bank-
ruptcy. From the time the trustee filed bankrupt's tax return, accompanied by an
application for a tentative carryback adjustment, the maximum additional delay until
discharge would be three months. Accordingly, a total period of fifteen months would
probably have elapsed from filing to discharge.
30 See notes 25, 29 rupra.
31 A division of the normal taxable year into two would create an unnecessary
assymetry in the Internal Revenue Code and would result in needless duplication
by requiring the government to process two tax returns and possibly two applica-
tions for carryback adjustments over a period for which only one of each is usually
submitted.
32Bankruptcy Act §70(a)(5), 52 Stat. 880 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(a) (5) (1958). See note 6 mipra. Since the right of action under discussion
arises against the United States, its transferability would be controlled by the Assign-
ment of Claims Act, Rxv. STAT. § 3477 (1875), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1958).
In order to conclude that the claim is transferable by the bankrupt prior to bank-
ruptcy, it would be necessary to suppose that the application could be filed, the claim
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tract under section 70(a) (6)) 3 in order to vest it in the trustee. Although
both of these constructions are tenable, neither is compelling. Thus, to
choose this indirect remedy would run the risk of Congress' clear purpose
being frustrated. Clearly, therefore, the most effective way to eliminate
the carryback adjustment windfall is to amend the bankruptcy law directly.
FOREIGN RELATIONS-CoNGREss MAY VALmLY ENAcT LEGIS-
LATION EMBODYING PRoTE T IV THEoRY oF RImINAL JURISDICTION
Six aliens who gained entry into the United States by claiming a
preferred immigration status 1 were convicted of knowingly making false
oaths before a United States consular official abroad.2 The convictions
were affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, which rejected an attack on the juris-
diction of the district court on the ground that the court was competent,
under the protective theory of criminal jurisdiction, to try an alien found
within its jurisdiction for a crime committed abroad against United States
sovereignty. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 948 (1961).8
allowed, the amount due ascertained, and the warrant for payment issued by the
government, all in one day. Such a construction would accept as transferable any
right which conceivably could have been transferred by the bankrupt prior to
bankruptcy.3 3 Bankruptcy Act §70(a)(6), 52 Stat. 880 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(a)(6) (1958). To vest title in the trustee under this section the right of
action would have to be construed as arising from a quasi-contractual relation be-
tween the bankrupt and the government. See note 19 supra.
1 The defendants had claimed to be spouses of United States citizens and thus
nonquota immigrants. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 101(a) (27) (A),
66 Stat. 169, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (27) (A) (1958).
2 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 402(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (1958):
Whoever . . .uses, attempts to use, possesses, obtains, accepts, or
receives any such visa, permit, or document [i.e., one "required for entry into
the United States"], knowing it . . . to have been procured by means of any
false claim or statement, or to have been otherwise procured by fraud or
unlawfully obtained; or ....
Whoever knowingly makes under oath any false statement with respect
to a material fact in any application, affidavit, or other document required by
the immigration laws or regulations prescribed thereunder . . .
Shall be fined . . . or imprisoned ....
For the authorization of United States consuls to administer oaths, see REv. STAT.
§ 1750 (1875), as amended, 34 Stat. 100 (1906), 22 U.S.C. § 1203 (1958).
sAt trial the six defendants were also convicted, under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1958),
of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in that they combined to enter the United
States unlawfully, see Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 275, 66 Stat. 229,
8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1958). The Government charged that the marriages on which they
based their claims for preference, see note 1 supra, were shams, contrived for the
purpose of gaining entry. The court of appeals held that instead of proving the
overall conspiracy charged, the prosecution had proved the existence of six separate
conspiracies, and that this variance between allegation and proof was so prejudicial
as to require reversal of the conviction. Whether the finding of prejudice was correct
cannot be determined on a reading of the opinion because of the court's failure
articulately to examine the "proceedings in their entirety" and heed the force of prior
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While studies in international law list five bases of criminal jurisdic-
tion,4 United States courts have traditionally accepted only the territorial
and nationality theories, thereby restricting their competence to crimes
committed within United States territory by anyone and to offenses per-
petrated by United States nationals anywhere. 5 But the statute construed
in the present case compelled the conclusion that it was to have an extra-
territorial effect. The proscribed act was perjury under circumstances
which almost necessarily must take place before a consular official-who is,
by definition, stationed abroad-in the course of his issuing a visa, a docu-
ment required of aliens prior to their departure for the United States.6
The court found it necessary, therefore, to consider the protective theory
of jurisdiction. This theory has been defined as an assertion of power by
sovereign states over aliens who by their criminal acts outside a state
endanger the continued existence of that state as a political entity.7 The
decisions, as required by the Supreme Court's caveat in Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750 (1946). The problems raised by multiple conspiracy prosecutions are
discussed in Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the
Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Con-
spiracy, 61 COLUm. L. Rnv. 957, 959-960, 977-996 (1961); Developments in the Law--
Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 920, 927-29, 991-993 (1959); Note, Federal
Treatment of Multiple Conspiracies, 57 COLUm. L. Rsv. 387, 388 (1957).
4 These five general principles are: first, the territorial principle, deter-
mining jurisdiction by reference to the place where the offense is committed;
second, the nationality principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the
nationality or national character of the person committing the offence; third,
the protective principle, determining jurisdiction by reference to the national
interest injured by the offence; fourth, the universality principle, determining
jurisdiction by reference to the custody of the person committing the offence;
and fifth, the passive personality principle, determining jurisdiction by refer-
ence to the nationality or national character of the person injured by the
offence.
Research in International Law--Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J.
INT'L L. 437, 445 (Supp. 1935). The allegiance theory, accepted in Great Britain,
is in effect a combination of the territorial and nationality theories. According to
this principle, one who enjoys the protection of the Crown owes allegiance to it in
return, and for a breach of allegiance he may be tried by English courts. The ter-
ritorial element of this theory stems from the concept that the King's protection ex-
tends to all parts of his realm. Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946]
A.C. 347.
5 The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824) ; United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) (dictum); cf. American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). In United States v. Archer, 51 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.
Cal. 1943), the court avoided reliance on the protective theory of jurisdiction by
characterizing the United States consulate where the perjury in question had been
committed as United States territory. The district court in the present case explicitly
rejected this ground for decision, United States v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 492
(S.D. Cal. 1960), and on appeal, it was not mentioned.
6 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 211(a) (requiring immigrant
to have "immigrant visa" before admittance), §101 (a) (16) (defining "immigrant
visa" to require that it be "issued by a consular officer at his office outside the United
States"), 66 Stat. 181, 169, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1181(a), 1101(a) (16) (1958). The intended
extraterritorial effect of the statute is more fully discussed in the opinion of the dis-
trict court in the instant case, United States v. Rodriguez, supra note 5.
7"A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside its terri-
tory by an alien against the security, territorial integrity or political independence of
that State, provided that the act or omission which constitutes the crime was not
committed in exercise of a liberty guaranteed the alien by the law of the placb where
it was committed." DRAFr CONVENTION ON JURIsDIcTION WITH ERsp-r ToCrm
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theory was once accepted by the Seventh Circuit in a deportation proceed-
ing,' and in two civil suits under the antitrust laws 9 the United States has
exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction which certain writers analogize to
the protective theory.10 But the theory has been explicitly rejected by a
federal court in a criminal case."1 In the only other prosecution under the
statute involved in the present case, no objection was raised as to the juris-
diction of the court or the constitutionality of the law.'2
Although giving careful consideration to the power of Congress to
enact legislation embodying the protective theory, the court in the present
case did not rely on any specific constitutional provision; ' 3 rather, because
the power of the federal government with regard to sovereignty and foreign
affairs is unlimited by any specific provision of the Constitution and has
been held to be coextensive with that of any other sovereign state,' 4 the
court regarded the acceptance of the protective theory by other nations as
art. 7, in Research in International Law-Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, mupra
note 4, at 440; accord, Garda-Mom, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreigners for Treason
and Offenses Against the Safety of the State Committed Upon Foreign Territory, 19
U. Pirr. L. REv. 567, 568 (1958).
8 United States ex rel. Majka v. Palmer, 67 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1933). The relator,
an alien, had perjured himself before a United States consular official abroad. He
was therefore ordered deported by immigration officials as having admitted to the
commission of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus, holding that Congress could declare the com-
mission of such an act by an alien while abroad a crime and that the crime involved
moral turpitude.
9 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
10 Though the actions are civil in form, one writer has argued that since the
remedies available to the government are so severe as to be penal in nature, the cases
may be considered as applying the protective theory. Haight, International Law and
Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639, 640 (1954).
The American Law Institute has made a similar suggestion, though it also points out
that the cases are justifiable under an objective territorial principle. RESTATEmENT,
FOREIGN RErTzoNs LAw oF ThE UNimD STATeS §§ 8; 32, comment b (Tent Draft
No. 2, 1958).
11 United States v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The court held
that the United States had no jurisdiction to try an alien under the general statute
dealing with falsification of information before any government agency, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001 (1958), for falsifying outside the country a material fact in a matter within the
jurisdiction of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
12 Chin Bick Wah v. United States, 245 F.2d 274 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 870 (1957). In United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956),
an alien was convicted of perjury before a consular official abroad under a combination
of the statute empowering consuls to administer oaths, REv. STAT. § 1750 (1875), as
amended, 34 Stat. 100 (1906), 22 U.S.C. § 1203 (1958), and the general federal
perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1958), but no jurisdictional objection was raised.
18 The district court, however, found authority in Congress' power "to define and
punish . . . Offences against the Law of Nations," U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, and
comfort in the language of U.S. CoNsw. art. III, § 2, which provides that "the Trial
of all Crimes . . . when not committed within any State . . . shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed." United States v.
Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 487-92 (S.D. Cal. 1960), 13 STAN. L. REv. 155 (1960).
14 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
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a sufficient ground for its assertion by the United States.15 The court did
not, however, consider how other countries apply the protective theory,
finding it sufficient that its principle is generally accepted. Though not
mentioned in the opinion, provisions in the Polish and German penal codes
that require the punishment of aliens who make false oaths before officials
of the state while abroad 10 -and thus accept an application of the protective
theory substantially similar to that employed in the instant case-provide
precedent for and justify the court's decision.
In the instant case, the court concluded that the defendants' perjury
had an adverse effect on United States sovereignty and thus warranted
application of the protective theory.17 In so doing it equated the "existence
of the state as a political entity" with national sovereignty. 8 However,
it did not articulate why the offense had this effect. The Supreme Court
has defined sovereignty by reference to the powers of which it is com-
posed.19 One of them, the Court has said, is the power, "inherent in
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of
foreigners . "...1, 20 In the exercise of the sovereign power to exclude
aliens, consuls are entrusted with the duty of examining those who seek
to enter the United States to determine their eligibility for admittance. 21
An alien who lies during this examination impairs the ability of the consul
to rule on his right to enter the United States and thus undermines the
sovereign's power to exclude him.
Though the court could not escape the conclusion that the statute was
to have extraterritorial application, examination of its legislative history
does not reveal that Congress was aware of that possibility.2 2  Since Con-
gress has generally been reluctant to enact legislation with extraterritorial
15 Instant case at 549. For a discussion of the legal basis of United States
acceptance of the protective theory in the present case, see 13 STAN. L. REv. 155
(1960); 15 MIAmi L. REv. 428 (1961); 47 VA. L. REv. 1083 (1961).
16 CODE PPNAL arts. 8, 140 (Pol. Berezowskd 1932); CODE PPNAL AL.LEmAND
art. 4, § 3(1) (Ger. Comiti de Lgislation Etrang~re et de Droit International 1953).
17 "The acts done to violate § 1546 of Title 18 were all done outside the state,
but they were intended . . . to produce, and they did so produce, a detrimental
effect on the sovereignty of the United States. Thus, under 'the protective principle,'
. there is, and should be, jurisdiction" Instant case at 549.
18 This is the accepted basis of the protective principle. See note 7 Supra.
19 These include the powers to wage war, make peace, negotiate treaties, raise
an army, and acquire territory. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 316, 318 (1936) ; Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 265 (1901). See
also 5 ELLIoT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONsTiTUTioN 212 (1845); 1 STORY, Com-
MENTARIS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UN ITED STATEs 191-93, 195, 200-02 (5th
ed. 1891).
20 Nishimura Eliu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
21 See, e.g., 18 Stat. 477 (1875), 8 U.S.C. § 336 (1958); Imnigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952, §§ 103, 104, 212(a) (15), 66 Stat. 173, 174, 183, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1103, 1104, 1182(a) (15) (1958).
22 No Senate reports on the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1924, from which
the provision originates, exist. The House reports give no consideration to the
provision.
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effect, 23 the consequences of this possible inadvertance require a reexamina-
tion of the statute's policy. In the past, the United States Department of
State has protested real or apparent applications of extraterritorial provi-
sions of foreign law to American citizens 2 4 Current provisions of some
European codes extend criminal jurisdiction to acts of a purely political
or economic nature, including the publication of "hostile propaganda" 25
and the divulgence of industrial secrets. 2 6 Sections of the relatively recent
penal code of the Hungarian People's Republic, for example, state: "Hun-
garian law must also be applied to crimes by a foreigner committed in for-
eign territory if the act . . . b) involves damage to fundamental interests
of democratic public order or of economic order of the Hungarian People's
Republic regardless of whether or not the act is punishable by the law of
the place of commission . "...1, 27 The increasing scope of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction claimed by a few nations makes it likely that the
United States may find it necessary in the future to protest more frequently
the foreign prosecution of its citizens. By unintentionally adopting extra-
territorial jurisdiction in the statute upheld in the instant case, Congress
has effected a corresponding limitation on the ability of the United States
to make such protests persuasively.
Present law gives adequate protection to the United States' sovereign
power to exclude foreigners. Thus, aliens who gain entry by the very
means employed by the defendants in the present case-lying to an ex-
23 Research it; International Law-Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, .supra
note 4, at 544; Garcia-Mora, supra note 7, at 575; cf. RESTATEUMNT, FOIGN RELA-
TiONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 24, comment b; § 32, comment a (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1958). But in two cases, other statutes were combined to cover factual situa-
tions similar to that in the instant case. See notes 8, 12 supra.
2 4 In the Cutting case, in which an American citizen was convicted in Mexico
of criminal libel for the publication in Texas of defamatory statements regarding a
Mexican citizen, the State Department, though dealing with a theory of jurisdiction
based on the nationality of the injured party-the "passive personality" principle-
protested the prosecution, claiming that citizens of the United States could not be held
answerable in foreign countries for offenses committed elsewhere. Letter From Mr.
Bayard, Secy of State, to Mr. Connery, [1887] FOREIGN RFL. U.S. 755 (1887). In
the case of Warren and Costello, two American citizens were tried in Great Britain
for their participation in the insurrectionary Fenian Expedition. At their trial, evi-
dence was introduced as to words spoken and acts done by them in the United States.
The United States government, on the missupposition that they were being tried solely
for those acts and words, protested. In the case of Cirile Pouble, an American
citizen who was arrested by Spanish authorities in Cuba, the United States, believing
Pouble's trial was solely for membership in an organization within the United States,
protested through diplomatic channels. On learning that he was held for acts per-
petrated in Cuba, the United States withdrew the protest. 2 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL
LAw §§ 200-202 (1906).
2
5 YuGosIAv CramNIxAL CODE art. 118, in 10 NEw YuGOsLAv LAw 52 (1959).
2
6 CODE PENAL ALLEMAND art. 4, § 3(5) (Ger. Comit6 de Lgislation Etrangare et
de Droit International 1953).
,27 Ila loi hongroise doit Etre applique aussi au crime qu'un dtranger a commis
A 1'6tranger si lacte . . . b) porte atteinte aux inter6ts fondamentaux de l'ordre pub-
lic ddmocratique ou 6conomique de la R~publique populaire hongroise sans 6gard au
fait que l'acte soit punissable ou non d'apr~s les lois du lieu de la perpitration . .. ."
CODE PLNAL HONGROIS art. 4 (Hung. Comit6 de Legislation Etrang re et de Droit
International 1950).
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amining consul-may be deported.28  In addition, the circumstances of
illegal entry often allow for penal sanctions against aliens that do not
require the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction.2 Thus Congress
itself has already provided the means whereby the undesirable conse-
quences of the protective theory may be obviated.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-ICC RECOGNIZES CERTIFICATION
AND COMPLAINT PROCEDURES AS ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES FOR IN-
ADEQUATE SER CE By EXISTING CARRIERS
After it failed to organize employees of nonunion intrastate motor
carriers in Nebraska by direct methods, the Teamsters Union attempted to
apply indirect pressure by designating freight to and from these carriers
as "unfair goods" under "hot cargo" clauses 1 in its contracts with con-
necting interstate carriers. As a result, normal interchange of traffic from
the nonunion truckers for out-of-state delivery was disrupted; some of the
interstate carriers also ignored routing instructions and diverted traffic
bound for local points in Nebraska away from the nonunion truckers to
railroads and nonscheduled motor carriers, thereby causing delays and in-
creased costs to shippers. To circumvent this harassment, the nonunion
truckers and several other intrastate motor carriers in Nebraska estab-
lished a new interstate trucking concern, Nebraska Short Line Carriers,
Inc. In support of its application to the Interstate Commerce Commission
for a certificate of public convenience and necessity, Short Line submitted
that it could provide reliable interchange facilities to stockholder carriers
and thereby ensure adequate interstate service to area shippers. Short Line
also proposed to serve two shippers who, during strikes, had been denied
pickup and delivery services by union carriers because of "hot cargo"
restrictions. Over objections that it was deciding a labor dispute and that
relief was more properly available through the complaint procedure of
the Interstate Commerce Act, the Commission certified Short Line to
operate over certain interstate routes, noting as a general proposition that
28 Section 212(a) (19) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66
Stat. 183, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (19) (1958), requires the exclusion from the United
States of "any alien who seeks to procure, or has sought to procure, or has procured
a visa or other documentation, or seeks to enter the United States, by fraud, or by
willfully misrepresenting a material fact . . . ." Section 241 (a) (1) of the same
act, 66 Stat. 204, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1) (1958), provides for the deportation of any
alien who, at the time of his entry, was excludable. See also United States ex rel.
Majka v. Palmer, 67 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1933), summarized in note 8 stpra.
29 In the instant case the Government prosecuted the appellants for conspiracy
as well. Note 3 mtpra.
I Quoted in Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 194 F. Supp. 31, 43 (S.D. Ill.
1961).
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additional carriers may be certified whenever existing carriers provide
inadequate sevice to the public, the availability of other remedies not-
withstanding.2 The order was sustained by a divided three-judge district
court. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. ICC, 194 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. Ill.
1961), appeal docketed, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 3064 (U.S. Aug. 19, 1961)
(Nos. 336 and 337).
Prior to the instant case, resort to the ICC 3 for relief from the un-
lawful refusal of a common carrier to provide adequate service because of
labor union difficulties has been taken through the "complaint" procedure 4
of the Interstate Commerce Act.5  In spite of the labor-management ele-
ment of such a case, the ICC still has jurisdiction to delineate the scope of
a carrier's duties under its certificate 6 and to determine whether or not
special circumstances excuse nonperformance 7  The Commission has
consistently held that "hot cargo" clauses do not abrogate the duty to
provide adequate service and has issued cease and desist orders against
offending carriers.
8
2 Nebraska Short Line Carriers, Inc., 79 M.C.C. 599, 613 (1959).
3 Injunctive remedies have also been available through the National Labor Rela-
tions Board or by direct application to state or federal courts. See, e.g., Quaker City
Motor Parts Co. v. Inter-State Motor Freight Sys., 148 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Pa.
1957); Truck Drivers Local 728, 119 N.L.R.B. 399 (1957), modified, 265 F.2d 439
(1959); Beck & Gregg Hardware Co. v. Cook, 210 Ga. 608, 82 S.E.2d 4 (1954);
Flood, Common Carrier's Duty to Serve Strike-Boind Plants, 24 ICC PAc. J. 30,
37 (1956).
4 Interstate Commerce Act, Part II, § 212(a), 49 Stat. 555 (1935), as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1958).
5 See cases cited notes 6 and 7 infra.
See, e.g., McJunkin Corp. v. Smith's Transfer Corp., 13 Fed. Carr. Cas. 40688
(ICC 1959); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 42 M.C.C.
225 (1943); Planters Nut & Chocolate Co. v. American Transfer Co., 31 M.C.C.
719 (1942).
7 See Galveston Truck Line Corp. v. Ada Motor Lines, Inc., 73 M.C.C. 617
(1957) ; Planters Nut & Chocolate Co. v. American Transfer Co., supra note 6. In
Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 109 (1958), the Court
said: "It is the Commission that in the first instance must determine whether, because
of certain compelling considerations, a carrier is relieved of its usual statutory duty, and
necessarily it makes this determination in the context of the particular situation pre-
sented by the case before it." See generally Scurlock, Carriers and the Duty to
Cross Picket Lines, 39 TEXAs L. RExv. 298 (1961).
8 A long line of cases has asserted the duty of common carriers to serve accord-
ing to their certificates in the face of union activities, provided no actual violence is
imminent, and has withheld from them the defense of "hot cargo" clauses, usually on
the theory that a common carrier cannot bargain away its obligations to the public.
See, e.g., McJunkin Corp. v. Smith's Transfer Corp., 13 Fed. Carr. Cas. 40688
(ICC 1959); Planters Nut & Chocolate Co. v. American Transfer Co., 31 M.C.C. 719
(1942); Elbert & Rebman, Common Carriers and Picket Lines, 1955 WAs. U.L.Q.
232; Scurlock, supra note 7; 33 NOTRE DA.ru LAw. 489 (1958). Certificate revoca-
tion may be predicated on willful failure to comply with cease and desist orders.
Interstate Commerce Act, Part II, § 212(a), 49 Stat 555 (1935), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 312(a) (1958). After finding that a carrier has violated its certificate, the
act, or any lawful order of the ICC, the Commission may order the carrier to correct
the deficiency within a given period (not less than thirty days) or forfeit its cer-
tificate. See Cochrane Transp. Co., 62 M.C.C. 164 (1953). for the requirement of an
initial finding of violation. In Florence Lane, 52 M.C.C. 427 (1951), it was held that
there could be no revocation without notice, hearing, and the minimum thirty-day
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Although the courts have accorded the Commission broad discretion 9
in certification proceedings to determine whether "the proposed service
. . . is or will be required by the present or future public convenience and
necessity," 10 a showing of the inadequacy of existing service is generally
demanded.-" Apart from the overriding requirement that the administra-
tive action have a "rational basis," 12 however, there is no judicially imposed
limit on the Commission's discretion to decide what circumstances may
appropriately support a finding of inadequacy. The proposition that service
is inadequate if existing carriers are unwilling or unable to handle available
freight'13 has been invoked in granting operating rights when authorized
carriers have had inadequate facilities 14 or have provided service of a
quality unacceptable to shippers.15 The ICC has also held that evidence
that the rates of existing carriers are so high as to constitute an embargo
on subject freight is sufficient to establish inadequacy, on the theory that
such rates signify an unwillingness to serve.16 It is apparent that in these
period. It was noted, however, that a certificate might be summarily suspended. In
R. D. Fowler Motor Lines, Inc. v. Colonial Motor Lines, Inc., 43 M.C.C. 781 (1944),
the thirty-day requirement was recognized even in the case of willful abandonment.
No case has been found in which a certificate was revoked for failure to comply with
cease and desist orders in "hot cargo" situations.
9 See ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65 (1945) ; United States v. Carolina Freight
Carriers Corp., 315 U.S. 475, 482, 490 (1942). See generally CooPER, ADMINISTRA-
TIrVE AGENCIES AND THE CouRTs 370-71 (1951), for the background of judicial respect
for orders of the ICC. Concerning review of ICC orders, it is normally said that the
judicial function is limited to determining whether the order is within the ICC's
statutory power, whether there was an error of law, and whether the facts upon
which the order was based are supported by the evidence. See, e.g., ICC v. Union
Pac. R.R., 222 U.S. 541 (1912). The findings of the Commission must be specific
and definite enough that the reviewing court can determine what facts were used to
arrive at the orders. Inland Motor Freight v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 520 (E.D.
Wash. 1945).
10 Interstate Commerce Act, Part II, § 207(a), 49 Stat 551 (1935), 49 U.S.C.
§307 (1958).
11 See Hudson Transit Lines, Inc. v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 153, 156-58
(S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd per curiam sub noa. Adirondack Transit Lines, Inc. v. Hudson
Transit Lines, Inc., 338 U.S. 802 (1949). In Filson v. ICC, 182 F. Supp. 675, 676
(D. Colo. 1960), the court emphasized that "an inadequacy of existing facilities is a
basic ingredient in the determination of public necessity" and affirmed an order denying
certification on the ground that such an inadequacy had not been shown. Accord,
Inland Motor Freight v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 520, 525 (E.D. Wash. 1945).
But see Norfolk So. Bus Corp. v. United States, 96 F. Supp. 756, 758-60 (E.D. Va.)
(dictum), af'd, 340 U.S. 802 (1950).
12 See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87-88 (1944) ; Minne-
apolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 165 F. Supp. 893, 897 (D. Minn. 1958), aff'd,
361 U.S. 173 (1959).
'. See note 11 supra. See Ray E. Cagle, 13 Fed. Carr. Cas. 34649 (ICC 1959),
for a recent invocation of this principle.
14 See K & W Boat Transp., Inc., 76 M.C.C. 403 (1958).
15 See, e.g., Strickland Transp. Co., 77 M.C.C. 655 (1958), modified, 84 M.C.C.
562, modified sub nwn., T. S. C. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 186 F.
Supp. 777 (1960) ; Liquid Transporters, Inc., 76 M.C.C. 685 (1958).
16United Parcel Serv., Inc., 68 M.C.C. 199 (1956); see Herman R. Ewell, 72
M.C.C. 645 (1957); H. L. & F. McBride, 62 M.C.C. 779 (1954). If the supporting
shippers are merely dissatisfied with existing rates, however, additional carriers will
not be certified. There must be an actual embargo, evidencing a desire to discourage
freight. See, e.g., E. L. Reddish, 81 M.C.C. 35 (1959); Detroit-Pittsburgh Motor
Freight, Inc., 79 M.C.C. 197 (1959).
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certification cases the ICC did not treat the fact that inadequate service
might be remedied by other means 1 7 as relevant to the ultimate question
of "present inadequacy." 1I In the instant case, however, the significance
of alternative remedies was squarely raised by the Commission's unrebutted
assumption that the nonperforming carriers were guilty of certificate
violations.19
In a certification proceeding decided concurrently with that in the
present case, Galveston Truck Line Corp. argued that additional operating
authority was necessary to protect it from further refusals of unionized
connecting carriers to interchange under through route agreements.
20
The Commission denied this application on the ground that a mere threat
of boycott under "hot cargo" contracts was insufficient to establish public
convenience and necessity; it pointed out that Galveston in fact had been
boycotted for less than two months, that the boycott had been terminated
more than three years before action on Galveston's application, and that
both the ICC and the NLRB had issued cease and desist orders against
1VIn the case of simple refusal to serve, relief would be available through the
complaint procedures of § 212(a), 49 Stat. 555 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 312(a)
(1958). See note 8 supra. Rate embargoes, however, would have to be attacked
through §216(e) of the act, 49 Stat 558 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §316(e)
(1958), dealing with reasonable rates. If the applicant were forced to seek relief
under either of these sections--especially the latter-before turning to certification,
considerable delay would result. In Davidson Transfer & Storage Co. v. United States,
42 F. Supp. 215, 219-20 (E.D. Pa. 1941) (dictum), the court said that the delay
inherent in complaint procedures would justify certification when protestant carriers
were remiss in their duties. This conclusion, however, fails to take account of the
possibility of granting temporary operating authority pursuant to Interstate Commerce
Act, Part II, § 210a, added by 52 Stat. 1238 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 310a
(1958). See Galveston Truck Line Corp. v. Ada Motor Lines, Inc., 73 M.C.C. 617,
622-23 (1957) (temporary authorization not followed by certification). Further, the
Davidson dictum fails to account for the statement of the ICC that it is contrary to the
National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899 (1940), preceding 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1958),
to grant permanent authority to relieve only temporary disabilities. See Foss Launch
& Tug Co., 260 I.C.C. 525, 543 (1945) (water carrier case). Whatever unfairness
may inhere in the refusal to continue authority because of the resumption of service
by defaulting carriers is overcome by the fact that the injured carrier may recover
damages from those carriers. See Galveston Truck Line Corp. v. Ada Motor Lines,
Inc., 13 Fed. Carr. Cas. 50080 (W.D. Okla. 1958) (mem.) (complaint dismissed
for failure to state a claim in conspiracy for which relief could be granted, with
leave to amend to state claims against individual defendants) ; cf. Merchandise Ware-
house Co. v. A. B. C. Freight Forwarding Corp., 165 F. Supp. 67 (S.D. Ind. 1958).
18 Compare Herman R. Ewell, 72 M.C.C. 645 (1957) (use of embargoes to avoid
traffic), with United Parcel Serv., Inc., 68 M.C.C. 199 (1956) (reasonable embargoes
on small packages; United Parcel organized to compete with parcel post). These
cases offer instances in which complaint proceedings would, and would not, seem
appropriate. See also William Coxon, 4 Fed. Carr. Cas 113 (ICC 1944) (com-
peting carrier certified when the only other carrier in the field legally suspended
adequate operations because it could not survive economically at the time). The
failure of the Commission to consider the available approaches concurrently probably
reflects the distinct foci of the two sections. Under the complaint procedure, with
its sanction of certificate revocation, the Commission directly addresses unlawful
carrier activities. Certification, on the other hand, has a less immediate effect on
existing carriers and functions primarily to relate proposed service to transportation
needs.
19 79 M.C.C. at 613; instant case at 55-57.
2 0 Galveston Truck Line Corp., 79 M.C.C. 619, 620-21 (1959).
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the offending carriers.21 The fact that the brevity of the boycott was
caused by Galveston's choice of remedies, however, was not considered.P
Read together, these cases suggest alternative remedies for harassed non-
union carriers, with relief through complaint procedures barring additional
certification. The converse of this limitation, however, does not follow.
There is no reason why subsequent to obtaining operating authority a
carrier could not, if it desired, get compliance orders directed to non-
performing competing carriers.23  Because of the value of interstate
operating rights,2 4 a carrier presented with the option 25 would presumably
pursue certification first, since further relief would not be foreclosed.
Failure to anticipate the significance of this option led Galveston to a
self-defeating election of the complaint procedure.
Assuming that it lies within the statutory power of the Commission
to certify a new carrier even when the inadequacy of service might be
remedied by complaint procedures, the conscious use of these alternatives
by the Commission can have important consequences for carrier regulation.
If, as the dissent maintained, cease and desist orders must precede certifica-
tion when the nonperformance of existing carriers is alleged,26 the thirty-
21 The boycott extended from mid-April through May 1955, when it was lifted
pursuant to an agreement between the NLRB and the Teamsters. In August 1955
the Tenth Circuit enforced the Board's cease and desist order. In January 1956 the
ICC docketed Galveston's complaint, having earlier returned it for additional facts.
Cease and desist orders were entered by the Commission against the guilty carriers
in December 1957. Galveston Truck Line Corp. v. Ada Motor Lines, Inc., 73 M.C.C.
617 (1957). Galveston had filed its application for additional operating rights on
December 1, 1955. On June 1, 1959, the Commission denied the application. Gal-
veston Truck Line Corp., 79 M.C.C. 619, 622 (1957).
22The Commission distinguished Short Line's application from Galveston's on
the ground that "the labor difficulties upon which . . . [Galveston's application]
was based had, with one minor exception, ceased to exist for some time prior to the
hearing, whereas in the instant proceeding such difficulties were of more recent origin
and were continuing to be experienced up to and including the time of the hearing.
Such distinction, we believe is important, because of the use of the term 'present or
future public convenience and necessity' in section 207 of the act .... " 79 M.C.C.
at 613.
23 There is no standing requirement for complainants under § 212(a) of the act,
49 Stat. 555 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1958). The possibility of
securing the revocation of the nonperforming carrier's certificate would underlie such
a move. In Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. American Bus Lines, Inc., 53
M.C.C. 117, 118 (1950), the complainant carrier presented an appealing rationalization
in terms of transportation economics: "They [complainants] are not opposed to the
institution of service by defendant over the disputed routes and the additional com-
petition which may be occasioned thereby, but insist that they are entitled either to
be met with such competition now or to have the latent threat of future competition
removed because it constitutes a threat to the proper development of their own
routes." An order requiring the resumption of service was entered.
24 See Hale & Hale, Competition or Control III: Motor Carriers, 108 U. PA. L.
Rnv. 775, 799 (1960).
25 Competing carriers, whose operating authorities by definition are at least equal
to those of the nonperforming carrier, would not have this option; they would be
limited to relief through the complaint procedures. Cf. Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc. v. American Bus Lines, Inc., 53 M.C.C. 117 (1950).
26 Instant case at 64-66 (dissenting opinion).
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day warning period provided by the complaint provision 27 might work to
insulate defaulting carriers from the immediate pressure of competition,
for a carrier would have no reason to resume adequate service or resist
union demands 28 until a complaint has been filed. A belated resumption
of normal service would then serve to meet the carrier's duty under the
cease and desist order. The doctrine of the present case, however, should
prompt a nonperforming carrier to seek determination of its duties and
relief from the unlawful actions of third parties as soon as possible,29 since
once applications for competing rights are made, the ICC is unlikely to
credit enthusiastic offers of renewed service by defaulting carriers appearing
as protestants3 0 Similar considerations obtain for existing carriers in
competition with the nonperforming ones. So long as there is no danger
of additional certification, the nonperformance of area carriers will have
no adverse effect on competitors.3 1  When the threat of additional com-
petition arises, however, these performing carriers, in order to protect
their own interests, would have to expand operations to meet present
inadequacies or file complaints to compel resumption of services by de-
faulting carriers.3 2  In the present case, there was no indication that the
innocent protestants made any efforts to secure additional traffic.33
27 Interstate Commerce Act, Part II, § 212(a), 49 Stat. 555 (1935), as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1958): "[N]o . . . certificate, permit or license shall be revoked
. . . unless the holder thereof willfully fails to comply, within a reasonable time,
not less than thirty days, to be fixed by the Commission, with a lawful order of the
Commission . . . ." See note 8 .mtpra.
28 Presumably the threat of union displeasure would outweigh the attendant loss
of traffic.
29 Technically, if it were determined that the petitioner's nonperformance was
excused, the inadequacy of existing service could be remedied only by a grant of addi-
tional authority. See William Coxon, 4 Fed. Carr. Cas. 113 (ICC 1944). Pre-
sumably, however, the Commission would be more disposed to call the inadequacy
temporary and use temporary authority to relieve the situation. See Hale & Hale,
mtpra note 24, at 808, for comment on the ICC's preference for certification even when
complaint relief might be available.
It would appear that the threat of certificate revocation implicit in cease and desist
orders would have more effect on a carrier that simply abandoned unprofitable opera-
tions than the allowance of additional competition.
30 See instant case at 57-58; cf. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S.
498, 515-16 (1910).
81 Indeed, nonperformance of competitors would seem to work to the advantage
of other carriers in the field, insofar as it tends to divert additional freight to them.
But see Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Herrin Transp. Co., 52 M.C.C. 453 (1951)
(competing carriers obtain order requiring nonperforming carrier to deliver according
to certificate rather than interchanging to avoid unprofitable hauls).
32 There would be no problem of the standing of competitors to bring such a suit,
See note 23 supra. If complaint procedures were ineffectual because the reinstated
service was still inadequate, or if the certificate of the nonperforming carrier was
revoked, the competing carriers would still have to expand their operations to forestall
the entry of additional operators in the field.
33 See instant case at 38-39; 79 M.C.C. at 603. There was no substantial evidence
of solicitation by performing carriers of the traffic from nonunion carriers. See in-
stant case at 37. See H. L. & F. McBride, 62 M.C.C. 779 (1954), for the significance
of solicitation by protestants.
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One important objection raised by the dissent was that the present
decision in fact settled a labor dispute.8 4 Once it is accepted that cease and
desist orders can properly be addressed to a carrier whose nonperformance
results from "hot cargo" agreements,35 however, it follows that the power
of the ICC to grant certification against a strong showing of inadequacy is
no usurpation of power. It is patent, however, that the present decision is
less favorable to union interests than the usual complaint procedure. Just
as the warning period protects nonperforming carriers from an immediate
dilution of their interests, it also protects the union. The threat of im-
mediate competitive certification, on the other hand, not only provides
incentive for all carriers in the field to protest inadequate service springing
from unreasonable union demands, but creates a potential for admitting
nonunion operators into a union-dominated field as well.36 Full recognition
of the doctrine of the present case, then, might well result in a substantial
curb on unreasonable union activities affecting the operations of interstate
motor carriers.
In addition to promoting an increased competitive awareness between
existing carriers and discouraging unreasonable union action, the instant
case appears to reflect growing pressure for amelioration of the stringent
entry requirements based on the phrase "public convenience and neces-
sity." 37 To require initial resort to complaint procedures only protects
the status quo. The present case, in contrast, imposes substantial burdens
of proof on protesting carriers when an application for certification is
predicated on nonperformance under existing certificates. Thus, by certify-
ing Short Line, which promised "hard" competition, the Commission
avoided the usual charge of paternalistic concern for existing carriers.
38
34 Instant case at 64.
35 See notes 6 and 8 supra.
3 6 Even the revocation of a union carrier's certificate under complaint procedures
would be less harmful to union interests than the present attack, for after revocation
the field would still be dominated by union carriers.
37 See Select Committee on Small Business, Competition, Regulation, and the
Public Interest in the Motor Carrier Industry, S. REP. No. 1693, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1956), for virulent criticism of the restrictive certification policies of the ICC. The
Committee recommended that § 207 of the Interstate Commerce Act be amended to
create a presumption in favor of entry. Thus, the protestants would have to prove
that the proposed service "is not or will not be required by the present or future
public convenience and necessity." Id. at 28. See HuDsON & CONSTANTIN, MOrO
TRANSPORTATION 507-09 (1958), for criticism of the Committee's report; Nelson,
Patterns of Competition and Monopoly in Present-Day Transport and Implications
for Public Policy, 26 LAND EcoN. 232, 238-48 (1950), for criticisms of the whole
system of regulation in motor carrier commerce, raising the implication that free
competition would be preferable to the present arrangement.
38 See 109 U. PA. L. REv. 892 (1961), for comment on the Commission's tendency
to be solicitous of the interests of existing carriers; cf. ICC v. J-T Transp. Co.,
30 U.S.L. WEEK 4019, 4021-22 (U.S. Dec. 4, 1961), in which the Supreme Court
held that new statutory language making "the effect which granting the permit
would have upon the services of protesting carriers" one of five criteria for judging
public convenience and necessity in contract carrier certification proceedings does not
permit the ICC to entertain "a presumption that the services of existing [common]
carriers will be adversely affected by a loss of potential traffic, even if they may not
have handled it before. . . . [T]he burden of proving inadequacy of existing serv-
ices . . . is improperly placed on the applicant . .. ."
RECENT CASES
KIDNAPPING-MOVEMENT INCIDENTAL TO T E COMMISsION oF
A CRmE HELD INSUFFIOCINT To SUPPORT INDICTMENT FOR SIMPLE
KIDNAPPING IN CALIFORNIA
A group of pickets converged at the gate of a California labor camp
for the purpose of persuading Mexican farm workers to join with them in
striking. After calling the workers to come out, some of the pickets forced
their way through the camp gate. During the ensuing fracas, one worker
was chased into the barracks and then told to leave by a knife-wielding
picket, another worker was pushed toward the gate, and a cook was grabbed
by the shirt, pulled out of the toilet, struck in the back of the head, dragged
some fifteen feet, thrown to the ground, and kicked. The pickets involved
were indicted on charges of conspiracy, rioting, assault, and kidnapping. In
a prohibition proceeding brought to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain the indictment, the Supreme Court of California, while upholding
the other counts of the indictment, ordered that the counts relating to
kidnapping be dismissed, since the movement involved was merely ici-
dental to the rioting and assault and did not satisfy the asportation require-
ment of section 207 of the California Penal Code.1 Cotton v. Superior
Court, 364 P.2d 241, 15 Cal. Rptr. 65 (Cal. 1961).
At common law, assault, false imprisonment, and kidnapping form
a hierarchy of nonhomicide crimes against the person. False imprisonment,
while generally including an assault, contains the additional element of
constraint; 2 kidnapping subsumes assault and false imprisonment but is in
turn distinguished by the element of asportation-the movement of the
victim from one place to another.3 To establish kidnapping at common
law, it was necessary to show that the victim had been carried out of the
country, away from the protection of its laws; such an act was punished
as a misdemeanor.4 Modern statutes have suppressed the common-law
emphasis on asportation by defining the characteristic element of kidnapping
as detention, intent to detain,6 or intent secretly to detain; 7 such statutes
punish kidnapping as a felony.8 In California the common-law element of
I "Every person who forcibly steals, takes, or arrests any person in this state,
and carries him into another country, state, or county, or into another part of the
same county . . . is guilty of [simple] kidnaping."
2 See People v. Cohoon, 315 Ill. App. 259, 42 N.E.2d 969 (1942); 2 Bisnop,
CRIMINAL LAW §§ 747-48 (9th ed. 1923).
3 See Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26, 139 A.2d 209 (1958), 19 MD. L. REv. 165
(1959).
44 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *219; see Fisher & McGuire, Kidnapping and
the So-Called Lindbergh Law, 12 N.Y.U.L.Q. R Ev. 646 (1935); Gershenson, Kid-
napping and Abduction, 21 BROOKLYN L. REv. 20 (1954); Perkins, Non-Honticide
Offenses Against the Person, 26 B.U.L. REv. 119, 190-94 (1946).
5 E.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §40-2-44(2) (1953).
6 E.g. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1250(1).
t E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 805.01 (1944).
8 See generally Note, A Rationale of the Law of Kidnapping, 53 CoLuM. L. REv.
540, 543-48 (1953).
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asportation has been retained in the statutory definition of simple kid-
napping, but has been modified to the extent that a forcible taking and
carrying away of a person into another part of the same county, with no
specific intent," constitutes an indictable offense.' 0
Judicial interpretation of the asportation requirement for simple
kidnapping in California has been colored by a somewhat distorted con-
struction of the statute proscribing aggravated kidnapping (for ransom,
extortion, or robbery)." Before 1951, convictions for kidnapping for the
purpose of robbery were sustained in cases in which, for example, the
seizure and confinement were merely necessary incidents to commission
of the robbery,' 2 the movement involved was slight,'3 or the requisite
robbery was an afterthought to a rape.14 By such decisions the courts
made "standstill" robbery in effect a capital offense, punishable as ag-
gravated kidnapping. In 1951 the California legislature inserted the words
"'or any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit
robbery" into the aggravated kidnapping statute so that the asportation
requirement would be explicit and mere detention of the victim during a
robbery would not amount to a separate crime.15 In the face of this
amendment, the state supreme court responded in People v. Chessman ' 6
by holding that "the fact, not the distance, of forcible removal" constitutes
the significant element of kidnapping under California law. This attitude,
rigidified into a black-letter proposition, became a major factor in the
construction of the simple kidnapping statute.'7 The words of asportation
9 See, e.g., People v. Dagampat, 167 Cal. App. 2d 492, 334 P.2d 581 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1959); People v. Trawick, 78 Cal. App. 2d 604, 178 P.2d 45 (Dist. Ct. App.
1947); People v. Hunter, 49 Cal. App. 2d 243, 121 P.2d 529 (Dist. Ct. App. 1942);
People v. Ogden, 41 Cal. App. 2d 447, 107 P.2d 50 (Dist. Ct. App. 1940); People v.
Sheasbey, 82 Cal. App. 459, 255 Pac. 836 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927); People v. Bruno,
49 Cal. App. 372, 193 Pac. 511 (Dist. Ct. App. 1920). But see People v. Oliver,
55 Cal. 2d 761, 361 P.2d 593, 12 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1961), which requires that the
asportation be done for an illegal purpose or with an illegal intent, where, because
of the victim's immaturity or mental condition, no legal effect can be given to his
actual consent to asportation.
10 CAL. PEN. CODE § 207, quoted note 1 supra. For other statutes incorporating
the element of asportation, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1601 (Supp. 1958) ; IND. AWN.
STAT. § 10-2901 (1956); LA. REV. STAT. § 14:45 (1950).
1 1 CAL. PEN. CODE § 209.
12 See People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 879
(1950), 38 CALF. L. Rav. 920 (1950), 24 So. CAL. L. REv. 310 (1951); People v.
Tanner, 3 Cal. 2d 279, 44 P.2d 324 (1935), 24 CAL. L. REV. 220 (1936).
13 See People v. Dugger, 5 Cal. 2d 337, 54 P.2d 707 (1936).
14 See People v. Brown, 29 Cal. 2d 555, 176 P.2d 929 (1947).
15 Historical note to CAL. PEN. CODE § 209; see People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d
166, 191, 238 P.2d 1001, 1016 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915 (1952). For an
account of the legislative history of this section before it was amended in 1951, see
3 STAN. L. REV. 156 (1950).
16 38 Cal. 2d 166, 192, 238 P.2d 1001, 1017 (1951). The court's construction was
made in answer to defendant's contention that the 1951 amendment should be applied
to him retrospectively.
17 See, e.g., People v. Rich, 177 Cal. App. 2d 617, 621, 2 Cal. Rptr. 600, 602
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960). This case assumed that Chessman, even though it involved
a construction of the aggravated kidnapping statute, should control construction of
the simple kidnapping statute to the extent that "distance, route taken, or area cov-
ered" are immaterial considerations.
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used in that statute were thus drained of their plain meaning by a series
of aggravated kidnapping cases upholding convictions for "standstill"
robbery. The indiscrimination with which precedents under the two
statutes have been applied is strikingly illustrated by People v. Wein.'8
In that case the defendant had been convicted on two counts of simple
kidnapping and five counts of aggravated kidnapping arising out of a series
of sexual attacks. The distance of asportation during the several attacks
averaged only seventeen feet. There was no discernible difference as to
the distance and quality of movement involved in the two classes of con-
victions, and the court, in affirming on all counts, treated them without
distinction.
By holding in the instant case that an independent crime of simple
kidnapping could not be established on the evidence adduced before the
grand jury, the California court seems to have rejected the thrust of its
earlier kidnapping decisions. In the present case, one man was seized,
moved fifteen feet, and kicked; another was chased into the barracks and
then told to leave. In Wein, a girl was seized, moved two feet, and
raped; then she was commanded to walk eight feet.' In spite of the com-
pelling factual similarity of these two cases, the court reached contrary
results as to the charges of simple kidnapping. It would be difficult to
distinguish them on the ground that the slight asportation involved in both
was, in the language of the court in the present case, 0 more "natural in" or
more "incidental to" rioting and assault than to a rape accomplished within
the confines of a single enclosure. The court recognized that mere move-
ment of the victim of a crime should not inevitably lead to the criminal's
being indicted for kidnapping, for movement is incidental to the commis-
sion of many crimes. The brief analysis in the opinion, however, furnishes
no clue as to when a carrying or dragging associated with such a crime as
rioting becomes sufficiently distinct to be treated as a separate offense.
In In Re Shull ' the California Supreme Court held that a statute im-
posing an additional five-year sentence when a felony is committed with a
deadly weapon should not be applied to the felony of assault with a deadly
weapon. The reason for the decision is clear; by definition the application
of the deadly weapon statute would result in an exaggerated penalty with-
out a sufficient accompanying rationale of deterrence.P A similar con-
sideration probably underlay the decision in the present case.23 The
Is 50 Cal. 2d 383, 326 P.2d 457, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 866 (1958), 359 U.S. 942,
992 (1959), 10 HASTINGS L.J. 323 (1959), 11 STAN. L. RE-v. 554 (1959). Wein
was termed the reductio ad absurdum case in Packer, The Case for Revision of the
Penal Code, 13 STAN. L. REv. 252, 259 n.41 (1961).
19 50 Cal. 2d at 413, 326 P.2d at 475 (dissenting opinion).
20 instant case at 244, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
2123 Cal. 2d 745, 146 P.2d 417 (1944).
22 Id. at 750-51, 146 P.2d at 419.
23 See People v. Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 204, 217 P.2d 1, 18, cert. denied, 340
U.S. 879 (1950) (dissenting opinion of Carter, J.).
19611
296 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.110
kidnapping statutes had been too often used in California to secure addi-
tional penalties, unjustifiable in terms of any aggravated risk, in cases
involving "standstill" crimes.2 4 The a priori reasoning of Shull, however,
was not available to the court in the present case; movement, while present
in most riots and assaults, is not an element in the definition of those
crimes. Consequently, the court resorted to the concept of movement
"natural to" a substantive crime such as rioting. Though the opinion gives
little body to this concept beyond the guidance to be gleaned from the
particular facts of the case,25 it would seem sound for the court in the
future to draw a line on the basis of the kind of risk created by the
asportation involved in a given case. Such an approach would restore to
the simple kidnapping statute its plain meaning by requiring that the carry-
ing away be substantially independent.
One rationale for making simple kidnapping a separate crime is the
risk of harm, not usually associated with assault or false imprisonment,
which arises when a victim is forcibly transported and restrained
for a protracted period 6 When a person is so moved, an aggressive
reaction becomes more likely than in a simple assault; movement goads,
and each step which takes the victim away from the familiar, away from
possible aid, aggravates his retaliatory and freedom-seeking impulses,
compounding the danger that serious injury will result. A simple
kidnapping statute can isolate the dangers and provocations peculiar to
asportation which are not directly proscribed by other criminal laws. If
such a statute is to be retained, it should be administered so as to empha-
size prevention of these dangers, not so as to allow additional penalties
for rape and other specific crimes.27 In cases like the present, there should
be an examination of the facts to determine whether or not the asportation
created a risk distinct from that inherent in the crime which the movement
accompanied; pertinent considerations should be whether the distance
covered was substantial and whether the victim was isolated from the aid
2 See cases cited notes 12-14, 16 supra.
25The court does mention, though without indicating the weight to be accorded
it, the requirement of an illegal purpose or intent to carry away in the crime of
simple kidnapping. Instant case at 244, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 68. To import a general
requirement of specific intent into the simple kidnapping statute would be an unwar-
ranted extension of the narrow holding of People v. Oliver, 55 Cal. 2d 761, 361
P.2d 593, 12 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1961), see note 9 =pra and accompanying text, and
would establish an unnecessarily difficult criterion in an area that would be better
served by the more objective criterion of risk.
26 See Note, supra note 8, at 554-55.
27But see id. at 556-58. It may be argued that simple kidnapping should be
abolished as a separate crime on the ground that the maximum penalties for the
various offenses which it usually accompanies, such as rape, are already sufficient to
meet any aggravating factors associated with extended movement, and that perhaps
asportation itself does not significantly add to the dangerousness of the criminal act,
since the distance and time of asportation may sometimes provide an opportunity
to frustrate the commission of a more serious crime. Such an argument has not
been accepted by state legislatures, however, and courts are compelled to function
within the framework of a statutorily defined crime of simple kidnapping.
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of others 28 If no such risk is apparent, an indictment for simple kid-
napping should be dismissed.
While it would be salutary for the California legislature to clarify
formally the meaning of the kidnapping statute in terms of the gloss placed
on it by the instant case, and thus to curb conclusively what seems to have
been a dangerous freedom of judges to contort the meaning of the word
"carries" in response to changes in public sentiment, perhaps it is more
realistic and appropriate to urge the courts, which originally eviscerated the
statute, to apply the rationale of the instant case not only in all simple
kidnapping cases but also in cases of aggravated kidnapping, where the
problems of construing what constitutes asportation are highly analogous.
2 9
2 8 
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
29 Cf. People v. Wein, 50 Cal. 2d 383, 415, 326 P.2 457, 476 (1958) (dissenting
opinion of Carter, J.).
